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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

RIGHTS OF REMITTERS AND OTHER OWNERS
NOT WITHIN THE TENOR OF NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS*
By

FREDERICK

K. BEUTELt

T

HERE is considerable confusion in the law as to the exact
rights of persons who find themselves in possession of
negotiable instruments for which they have given value, but
to which they are not parties. This confusion is due largely
to the fact that the law on this subject grew up in widely
scattered courts, under different business conditions, and
under varying conceptions of the law merchant, which are
so well illustrated in the many conflicting decisions in other
branches of the law of -commercial paper before the passage
of the Negotiable Instruments Law. With the exception of
section 49, the Negotiable Instruments Law is silent on the
rights of these owners who do not meet the formal requirements of a holder.
It is impossible accurately to conceive or to classify all
the conditions in which a person may become a bona fide
owner of an instrument to which he is not a party, or to
imagine the circumstances which might affect his claims
against the maker, drawer, indorsers, and sureties on the
paper. But in order to thread one's way through the
apparently conflicting decisions on this subject, a rough classification is necessary.
There are two general classes of cases dealing with the
rights of persons not parties to negotiable instruments, who
may acquire an interest either in the negotiable instrument
itself or through transactions surrounding the formation and
transfer of the paper. The first and most common in number
of law suits involved is the group of cases of transferees
without endorsement of order instruments, who take them
either by assignment or delivery from the payee, or subsequent holders.

fMember of the Pittsburgh Bar and Graduate Student Harvard
Law School, Cambridge, Mass.
*This article deals only with instruments payable to a named
payee; owners of order instruments would, of course, fall within the
tenor, and therefore would be classified as holders under the Negotiable 'Instruments Law, sec. 191.
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The second includes the cases of persons who procure
the instruments payable to the order of others than themselves directly from the maker or drawer. The most familiar
instance of this sort is the remitter who purchases a negotiable
instrument payable to his creditor instead of to himself with
the intention of remitting funds to pay his obligation. Another
is the buyer of an instrument intended for discount with
someone else, which, for some reason, failed of discount with
the payee named therein.
On the rights of the transferee without endorsement from
the payee or subsequent holder, the law is clear.
It has long been settled that a transferee, without indorsement from the payee, has all the rights of the payee against
all prior parties, but will not take the instrument free from
equities existing against the payee.:
As to the rights of the transferee without indorsement from
a holder subsequent to the payee, there was some dispute before
the Negotiable Instruments Law.2 But it is now clear under
section 40, 3 that such a transferee has the same rights as his transferor. Thus he would be free from equities existing against the
payee only if the transferor was a holder in due course, or the
transferee of a holder in due course. In addition, the cases under
the act give such a transferee without indorsement, legal title,'
and the right to have the transferor's indorsement by a suit in
equity.' But he does not become a bona fide holder until the
indorsement is received. 8
In all of these cases the transferee without indorsement stands
directly in the position of his transferor, and can acquire no more
"See note 17 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1105 and cases there cited at 1109
and 2following. See also note 10 L. R. A. (N.S.) at 548.
See notes cited above, also 23 L. R. A. 325, 330.
3"Where the holder of an instrument payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it, the transfer vests in the transferee such titles as the transferor had therein, and the transferee acquires, in addition, the right to have the indorsement of the transferor. But for the purpose of determining whether the transferee is a
holder in due course, the negotiation takes effect as of the time when
the indorsement was actually made." For cases under English Bill of
Exchange Act see 4 Eng. Rul. Cas. 335.
'Sees Chafee's 4th edition of Brannan on Negotiable Instruments
339, and cases there cited.
5
1bid., p. 345.
GKarsner v. Cooper, (1922) 195 Ky. 8, 241 S. W. 346, 25 A. L. R.
159, and note following on 163. See also Chafee's 4th edition of Brannan on Negotiable Instruments 340, and cases there cited.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

rights against prior parties than his transferor. This seems to be
sound law and the clear intent of the act.
However, there is one situation where the courts have given
* the transferee without indorsement greater rights than his transferor. This is the case of the transferee without indorsement
from an accommodation payee. It is clear that the payee would
have no rights on the instrument against the accommodating
maker, and thus if the payee's transferee receive only the rights
of the payee, under section 49, he could not recover on the instrument against the accommodating parties even if he had given value
to the payee. Yet it has been held in two cases involving this point,
one in Scotland under an identical section of the Bills of Exchange Act,7 and one in Indiana where a non-negotiable instrument
was involved,8 that the transferee could recover from the accommodating maker.
Although at first thought, it would seem that the transferee, being only in the position of an assignee, could get no better rights
than his assignor, it is clear that the original purpose of the
maker, in both cases, was to lend his credit to the payee; and this
was accomplished when the transferee took the instrument for
value. The only thing wanting to complete the right of the transferee was the failure to comply with the formalities of negotiable
paper. In the first instance it was the failure to indorse, and in
the second the failure to make the instrument negotiable; but in
both cases the general purpose was that the accommodation maker
lend his credit to the payee. In such cases as these, it is easy for
the courts to follow a rule that seems to be very common in the
cases of accommodation instruments, and hold that if the original
purpose of the transaction has been carried out substantially, and
if no hardship to them results, the accommodating parties will be
held as if all the details of the arrangement had been complied
With. This doctrine is based on the substance rather than the form
7
Hood v. Stewart, (1890) 17 Sess. Cases, 4th series, 749, decided
under section 31 (4) of Bill of Exchange Act. This case might be explained on the ground that the Scotch law has its origin in Roman and

Canon law, whch recognized the validity of a contract without con-

sideration, see 4 Eng. Rul. Cas. 316. However, the doctrine has also
come8 into common law through equity.
Earle et al. v. Fletcher American National Bank, (1919) 70 Ind.

App. 559, 123 N. E. 706.
9Meeker v. Shanks, (1887) 112 Ind. 207, 13 N. E. 712; Smith v.
Moberly, (1850) 10 B. Mon. (Ky.) 266, 52 Am. Des. 543; Herman's
Ex'r. v. Gregory, (1909) 131 Ky. 819, 115 S. W. 809; Dunn v. Weston,
(1880) 71 Me. 270, 36 Am. R. 310; Newbury Bank v. Rand, (1859) 38
N. H. 166; Jackson v. Jersey City First.National Bank, (1880) 42 N.
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of the transaction, and its application will become clearer as we
examine some of the more difficult cases of non-tenor owners of
negotiable paper.
The second class of non-tenor owners mentioned above, those
who have taken an order instrument for value before delivery to
the payee, and before he has acquired any rights thereon, should
be sub-divided into two additional classes, the remitter and the
substituted creditor after discount has been refused. Unfortunately, the courts and some of the writers on this subject have failed
to make this distinction. They have treated all these cases as if
they xested on the same ground.' 0
However, an examination of the facts will show that the
case of the remitter who later finds himself, usually through no
fault of his own, the owner of a bill or note payable to the order
of another person, is quite different from that of the party who
buys an instrument payable to another merely for an investment
or as a means of lending money. The former is the victim of an
unexpected miscarriage of an ordinary business transaction. The
latter is a careless investor in an extraordinary piece of negotiable
paper which on its face carries a warning to the prudent business
man. It should also be noted that the remitter is usually a party
to the original transaction which led to the formation of the instrument in question, which was drawn especially for his benefit;
while the substituted creditor comes into a transaction which was
not begun for his benefit and in the inception of which his interests
were never contemplated. These considerations should be given
weight in determining the right of the non-tenor owners against
the maker, sureties, drawer, acceptor, and irregular indorsers of
the instrument involved.
These owners have this much in common, that neither can be
a holder of the instrument because neither is "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note ..... or the bearer thereof."" It is clear
also that they cannot be termed as holders of a bearer instrument
on the ground that the payee is a fictitious person, 2 because the
J. 177; Utica Bank v. Ganson, (1833) 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 314. See also
1 Daniels, Negotiable Instruments, sec. 792; Farley National Bank v.
Henderson, (1897) 118 Ala. 441, 463, 24 So. 428, 434; Powell v. Waters,
(1819) 17 John. (N.Y.) 176. For a similar application of this principle
to a surety on a bond, see note, 28 L. R. A. (N.S.) 463.
lOSee the Rights of a Remitter of a Bill or Note, 20 Col. L. Rev.
749, cases cited on 752. See also 8 C. J. 210, n. 63, 64 and 65 where this
is treated as a question of delivery.
"Negotiable
Instruments Law, sec. 191.
12 Negotiable Instruments Law, secs. 9 (3) and 130. For discussion
of cases suggesting this view see note 79, below.
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payee in all these cases is a real person and the original intent was
that he was to be the party to collect on the instrument. It follows
that if they are not holders, they are not parties to the instrument
in the sense in which that term is used today. If, then, the rights
of the remitter and the substituted creditor are not mentioned in
13
the act, they must be determined by the law merchant.
Let us examine the rights of the remitter ;14 first, his claim
against the maker or the party intended to be primarily liable on
the instrument; and second, his rights against the parties intended
to be secondarily liable.
All cases agree that the remitter has a good cause of action
against the principal obligor,"5 and that this action will lie whether
the paper is given in exchange for a present consideration such
as cash or a loan, 16 or as a means of satisfying an old debt.:7
IsNegotiable Instruments Law, sec. 196. "In any case not covered
by this
4 act the rules of the law merchant shall govern."
1 The term remitter used in its business sense applies to any person who sends money or credit to another, usually through the medium
of a bank or commercial credit house. The remittance may be made
by negotiable instrument with the remitter acting as purchaser, payee,
or indorsee; by transmission of the money in specie; by postal money
order, express money orders and bank certificates of deposit in many
different forms; by wire; by wireless or in other ways. These transactions create many different relationships from which various legal
and equitable rights may arise. Some of these are suggested and discussed in notes, 16 A. L. R. 185, and 33 Yale L. J. 177 where numerous
cases are cited. The legal meaning of the term seems to be of ancient
origin, and corresponds with the business usage, see Scarlett, Stile of
Exchanges; Beawes, Lex Mercatoria; Williams v. Everett, (1811) 14
East 582, 595-6; Munroe v. Bordier, (1849) 8 C. B. 862 side note, and
871.. This article, being limited to the subject of bills and notes, discusses only the right of 'a remitter on a negotiable instrument payable
to a person other than himself.
"'Sutherland State Bank v. Dial, (1919) 103 Neb. 136, 170 N. W.
666; Spurrier v. Briggs, (1861) 17 Ind. 529; Trible et al. v. Bank of
Grenada, (1844) 10 Miss. 523; Farnsworth v: Sweet, (1830) 5 N. H. 267;
Planters & Merchants Bank v. Blair, (1843) 4 Ala. 613; Utica Bank v.
Garrison, (1833) 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 314; see also Gross v. Rowe, (1850)
22 N. H. 77; Allen v. Ayres, (1825) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 297; Digen, Admr.
v. Mandel, .(1906) 167.Ind. 586, 79 N. E. 899 Garthwaite v. Bank of
Tulare, (1901) 134 Cal. 237, 66 Pac. 326; Gellert v. Bank of California,
(1923) 107 Or. 162, 214 Pac. 377; and article by Underhill Moore, 20
Col. L. Rev. 749, 750-754.
' 6 Sutherland State Bank v. Dial, (1919) 103 Neb. 136, 170 N. W.
666; Cross v. Rowe, (1850) 22 N. Y. 77; Trible v. Bank of Grenada,
(1844) 10 Miss. 523; Garthwaite v. Bank of Tulare, (1901) 134 Cal. 237,
66 Pac. 326; Gellert v. Bank of California, (1923) 107 Or. 162, 214
Pac. 7377.
1 Farnsworth v. Sweet, (1830) 5 N. H. 267; Planters & Merchants
Bank v. Blair, (1843) 4 Ala. 613; Spurrier v. Briggs, (1861) 17 Ind. 259;
Trible v. Bank of Grenada, (1844) 10 Miss. 524; Utica Bank v. Garrison, (1833) 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 314; and see Allen v. Ayers, (1825) 3
Pick. (Mass.) 297.
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But as to the form of the action and the nature of the remedy,
there is a wide diversity of opinion. In the older American cases,
all of which are at law, the courts entertained some of the suits in
the name of the nominal payee for the benefit of the remitter, possibly on the grounds of implied assignment,"' while in others the
suit is allowed in the name of the remitter himself,' 9 the declaration being either in assumpsit on the note or in plain assumpsit
with the note put in as evidence. In others, and in the later cases,
arising under practice statutes or under the modern codes, some
20
courts have decided these cases on equitable grounds.
The exact theory upon which the remitter recovers from the
principal obligor, be he either maker, drawer or acceptor of the
instrument, is not easy to determine from the cases. The form of
the suit, in the name of the payee on the instrument, would suggest that the theory might be an analogy to an assignment; but an
examination of the principles involved will show that the nominal
payee never had any rights on the instrument, because it was never
delivered to him and he was not a party to the contract.2 1 If, then,
he had no right, he could pass none by assignment or by indorsement after maturity, as was done in some cases to enable suit to
22
be brought in the name of the remitter.
That the practice of bringing the action in the name of the
nominal payee is a mere fiction to force an unusual suit into a
familiar form is indicated by the case of Trible v. The Bank of
Grenada23 where the defendants, in an action by a remitter in the
name of the nominal payee, offered to prove set-offs against the
nominal payee, but such evidence was excluded, showing conclusively that the interests of the nominal payee are not involved
in cases of this nature.
I8 Trible v. Bank of Grenada, (1844) 10 Miss. 523; Farnsworth v.
Sweet, (1830) 5 N. H. 267; Planters National Bank v. Blair, (1843) 4
Ala. 613; Utica Bank v. Garrison, (1833) 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 314.
' Cross v. Rowe, (1850) 22 N. H. 77; Allen v. Ayers, (1825) 3 Pick.
(Mass.) 297; Spurrier v. Briggs, (1861) 17 Ind. 529. In states where
statutes allow suit by the real party in interest, it is to be expected that
the remitter will sue in his own name; but note the cases where this
procedure was followed in New Hampshire and Massachusetts under
the old
20 forms of pleading.
Spurrier v. Briggs, (1861) 17 Ind. 529; Sutherland State Bank
v. Dial,
(1919) 103 Neb. 36, 170 N. W. 666.
21
Telford v. Patton, (1892) 144 I1. 611, 33 N. E. 1119; Buehler v.
Galt, (1889) 35 Ill. App. 225; Gellert v. Bank of California, (1923) 107
Or. 162, 214 Pac. 377.
22See Cross v. Rowe, (1850) 22 N. H. 77, 85.
23(1844) 10 Miss. 523.
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These cases might be supported, on some ground of rights
arising from the transactions between the parties. As has already
been pointed out, the remitter is a party to the negotiations from
which the instrument arises, he has furnished the consideration for
the contract, and it was contemplated that the proceeds of the instrument when discounted by the payee would be used for his benefit. In the cases where the failure of the payee to accept the instrument is the cause of the remitter's loss and creates the necessity of his action against the principal obligor, the situation is clearly analogous to failure of consideration found in ordinary con'tractual dealings; and one might expect the remedy to lie in quasicontract under the category of failure of consideration. 24 The
recovery, on this theory, would be measured by the benefit received by the principal obligor and surety.
If this theory were followed, the remitter would be returned the
value of the consideration given to the maker or drawer, at the
time. of making the agreement from which the instrument arose.
If he paid cash, he would be entitled to the return of his money,
and if an old debt were the consideration, he would be given the
value of his former rights. This theory might explain the cases
where the failure of the transaction is due to no fault on the
part of the remitter and where the cash payment recovered was
equal to the face of the instrument. But quasi-contract fails completely to explain those cases where the remitter himself is in default; in that he has not carried out the contract by delivering the
instrument to the payee ;25 or those where the instrument was
drawn for a consideration other than cash, or for an old obliga-tion of the principal debtor to the remitter. In these cases, the
recovery of the face of the note from either the principal or the
surety, 28 shows that instead of adopting the quasi-contractual
remedy,'the courts are going forward with the contract. This would
be the practice of any bank, and the ordinary business conception of
fair dealing, i. e.: if the payee does not collect on the instrument
2
it should be paid to' the remitter who has given value for it. 7
24
See
2

Keener, Quasi-Contracts 292.
5For discussion of quasi-contractual recovery where the plainiff is at fault, see Keener, Quasi-Contracts, Chap. IV, pp. 214-258.
26Spurrier and others v. Briggs, (1861) 17 Ind. 529 where consideration was an old judgment; Sutherland State Bank v. Dial, (1919) 103
Nab. 136, 170 N. W. 666; Cross v. Rowe, (1850) 22 N. H. 77 where
consideration was a horse; Trible v. Bank of Grenada, (1844) 10
Miss.27 523 where consideration was an old debt and some bank notes.
For an example of this practice, see Buehler v. Gait, (1889) 35
Ill. App. 225, 226.
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This business conception might justify a recovery on the equitable ground of reformation of the bill or note to conform with
this secondary intention of the parties. The entire purpose of the
contract between the principal obligor and the remitter was a sale
of credit to the remitter, and the instrument might as well have
been made in his name as in the same of the payee. The principal
obligor has been unjustly enriched by the failure of the payee to
take the instrument and loses nothing by being required to pay the
remitter. Therefore, it is not surprising to find some courts going
forward on these equitable grounds to enforce its terms against
the principal obligor for the benefit of the remitter. 8 However,
this theory fails to explain why in all the cases except two the recovery has been at law, and not in a court of equity.
Some authorities have advanced the theory that the remitter's
recovery is at law for money had and received.20 This explanation would be entirely proper where the recovery is at law for the
amount paid; but it also fails to explain the cases where the consideration paid by the remitter was some object of value other than
money but where the judgment was on the note for its face value. 0
It should also be noted that in order to recover for money had and
received on a contract, the plaintiff would have to prove impossibility of performance, or breach of contract on the part of the defendant."'
But there are many cases allowing recovery where no such
32
proof is offered or where the action is on the bill or note itself.
Probably the most satisfactory explanation of the rights of the
remitter is to be found in the law merchant itself.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when negotiable
instruments were first being established in English Common Law,
the remitter was regarded as a party to a bill of exchange, and his
name actually appeared upon its face.. Malynes in his Le-k Met2

8Spurrier v. Briggs, (1861) 17 Ind. 529; Sutherland State Bank
v. Dial, (1919) 103 Neb. 136, 170 N. W. 666, where the courts cite
as authority Spreng v. Juni, (1909) 109 Minn. 85, N. W. 1015, 18
Ann. Cas. 222, a case where the payee's name was inserted bymistake.
See also note 28 Yale L. J. 695.
20
Chafee Progress of the Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 255, 264.
3oSee cases cited in note 26 above.
2
1Powlowski v. Hirschfeld et al., (1927) 238 Mich. 25, 213 N. W.
118.
2
3 Sutherland State Bank v. Dial, (1919) 103 Neb. 136, 170 N. W.
666; Trible v. Bank of Grenada, (1844) 10 Miss. 523; Cross v. Rowe,
(1850) 22 N. H. 77; see Allen v. Ayers, (1825) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 297,
299; and see also Moore's article in 20 Col. L. Rev. pages 752-753.
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catoria first published in 162233 sets forth a number of these old
bills, one of which follows

:4

"Laus Deo: Adj. 20 September 1622 in Amsterdam-100 at
33s 6d
At usance pay this my first Bill of Exchange unto W. M.
the sum of one hundred pounds lawful money of England, for value here by me received of D. H. Make him
a good payment, and put it to your Account. God keep you.
Subscribed, W. C.
On the backside indorsed, To my loving friend Master
G. M. Merchant at London, Pa."
Thirty years later Marius gives examples of other bills current
at the time. 35
Although few of these bills contain words of negotiability,
there is no doubt that they were the common form of bills of exchange of this period and were treated by the merchants as negotiable instruments. 5
It is equally clear that the merchants and writers of the period
recognized the four-party bill as the common form and the three37
party bill, the usual form today, as the exception.
33
For mention of this text see 5 Holdsworth, History of English
Law, 131-134 and vol. 8, p. 155.
34This is of course a foreign bill, which, 2 Street, Foundation of
Legal Liability 344, tells us was the only bill at this time known to
the custom of merchants. It is taken from the 1656 edition of Malynes
page 262. Other similar instruments of this date drawn in England
and on the continent are reproduced in full by 8 Holdsworth, History
of English
Law 152-153.
3
5Marius, Advice Concerning Bills of Exchange, 2d ed., 7 ff. where
a number of such bills are set forth in detail, one of which follows:
"Laus Deo, in London this 16th November 1654 for 100 sterling.
At six daies sight pay this my second Bill of Exchange (my first not

paid) to Mr. Abraham P or Assignes One hundred Pounds sterling,
for value here received of Mr. Iohn D.
put to my account per advice.

Make good payment, and
Your loving Friend
William M.

To Mr. Francis W.
Merchant dd
in
S da
Exon."
36
0f eleven forms given by Marius ten are clearly four party
paper, in one the remitter has the bill made payable to himself, three
contain the phrase "or order," and three have indorsements on them.
One of the bills set forth with indorsements which the author says
make it negotiable, see page 10, is a bill payable to a named payee
"or assignes" and by him indorsed to order or assigns.

378 Holdsworth, History of English Law 137, 153; 2 Street,
Foundations of Legal Liability 339; Scarlett, Stile of Exchanges 5,
xxi; Malynes, Lex Mercatoria, chap. v, 261 ff; Marius, Advice Concerning Bills of Exchange, 2d ed., 2.
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One hundred years later after the negotiable instrument had
been well established in the common law we find an author 38 stating the custom as follows:
"There are ordinarily four persons requisite in making Exchange, besides the broker, viz. two at the place where the money
is taken up and two where it is payable; as 1st the Deliveror,
Giver, Remitter or Negotiator, being the Person who delivers the
Money-2ndly the Taker or Drawer, who receives the Money by
way of Exchange-3rdly, the party who is to pay the Money in
Virtue of the Bill drawn on him, commonly called the Acceptant4thly, the person to whom the Bill is made payable and who is to
receive it, called the Possessor or Holder of it."
And, although today the remitter's name no longer appears on the
instrument, the custom of purchasing drafts or other credit instruments payable to the order of a third person has continued down
to the present, and is still a common practice among business men
all over the world.3 9
It is also clear that the merchants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries not only regarded the remitter as a formal party
to the bill, but also conceived that he had substantial rights and
duties on the instrument. Marius tells us that he was master of
the bill till paid and could stop payment.4 0 If the bill was dishonored he was entitled to immediate notice of protest and the
bill was returned to him in order that he could recover from the
drawer.-1 But if a bill payable some time after sight was refused
acceptance but had not yet been refused payment, it was returned
to the remitter who got security from the drawer, and then tried
to collect it on maturity from the drawee. 42 If at maturity the
38

Beawes, Lex Mercatoria 428.
39See Munroe v. Bordier, (1849) 8 C. B. 862, 871; Campbell, Cases
on Bills and Notes 437; Gellert v. Bank of California, (1923) 107 Or.
162, 171, 214 Pac. 377, 381. This business practice also gave rise to
the litigation in Assignee of Madras v. Lupprian, (1910) 33 Indian
Law Reports (Madras Series) 145; Melbourne Bank v. Ferguson,
(1897) 23 Victoria Law Reports 78; Melbourne Bank v. Denton Hat
Co., (1897) 23 Victoria Law Reports 87; Jewett v. Yardley, (C.C. Pa.
1897) 81 Fed. 920; Grossman v. Zaro, (1922) 119 Misc. Rep. 713, 197
N. Y. S. 305; Goeske v. Taylor, (1923) 205 App. Div. 429, 199 N. Y. S.
577..
4OMarius, Advice Concerning Bills of Exchange 18. For a similar
modern tendency to regard the remitter as having property in the
bill till delivered to payee see: William v. Everett, (1811) 14 East
581, Buehler v. Galt, (1889) 35 Ill. App. 225; Garthwaite v. Bank of
Tulare,
(1901) 134 Cal. 237, 66 Pac. 326.
41
Malynes, Lex Mercatoria 270; Marius, Advice Concerning Bills
of Exchange 35; Scarlett, Stile of Exchanges 27 xxv, 94 xvi, 301
xix, 304 xxv, 346, case 9 (1); Beawes, Lex Mercatoria 433 (24), 435
(40),42 538 (68).
Scarlett, Stile of Exchanges 91 viii suggesting a possible cause
of action by the remitter against the payee.
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drawee refused payment, the remitter had his remedy against
the drawer for the bill, costs of protest, exchange, and re-exchange.

43

That the merchants regarded this right as a recovery on the
bill itself is shown by a passage in Malynes. 44 Here, after explaining at length the process of reciprocal and double exchange,
where one merchant, AB, exchanges his bill drawn upon Venice
for a bill drawn by another merchant, CD, upon a party in Antwerp and payable to a third party there, the author says that if the
bill drawn by CD is returned protested to AB, the latter recovers its face value together with expenses from the drawer, although he paid no cash for the bill. Malynes himself points out
that this is a recovery on the bill.
It was also settled custom of merchants that the remitter was
required to produce the bill or give security to the drawer,"4 and
payment by the drawer to the remitter discharged the drawer from
further liability to all parties. 46
The rules and customs of the merchants in dealing with bills
of exchange were slow to find their way into the common law due
to the fact that the merchants had their own courts, and experience had taught them the hostility of the old common law to the
types of contracts involved in bills of exchange.4 7 .It is probably
due to this hostility to negotiability that we find that the earliest
cases involving bills of exchange are suits by remitters. Since the
remitter and the drawer were -parties to a contract involving the
exchange of money it was possible to state their rights as conceived by the law merchant in the form of an action of assumpsit.48

Thus we find one of the earliest pleas of this nature set forth in
Rastell's Entries 49 published in 1566. This declaration, founded
43

Scarlett, Stile of Exchanges 91 viii, 94 xvi, Beawes, Lex Merca-

toria 348 (70).

44Lex Mercatoria (1656), Chap. viii, page 270.
45
Scarlett, Stile of Exchanges 94 xvi. This is also the law today.
Goeske v. Taylor, (1923) 205 App. Div. 429, 199 N. Y. S. 577; Gellert
v. Bank
of California, (1923) 107 Or. 162, 214 Pac. 377.
46
Marius, Advice Concerning Bill of Exchange 35 (Reproduced
in 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 158, n. 1); 4 Comyn's Digest
244. 4
TFor a more complete account of the history of bills of exchange
see 2 Street, Foundation of Legal Liability, Chap. xxxii, and 8 Holdsworth,
48 viii, 113-177; 1 Cranch (U.S.) 368, 2 L. Ed. 368.
Some of the reporters class the earlier action as being on the
case. This, however, is not significant for our purposes, because at
this time assumpsit and case were not yet clearly distinguished.
4"At f. 10a. This plea is set out in 1 Cranch (U.S.) 375; 2 L. Ed.
374; 2 Street, Foundation of Legal Liability 343.
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595,

in assumpsit, states that A (the remitter) paid B (the drawer) a
sum of money on a promise that B would procure G (the drawee)
to pay S (the payee) a like amount in certain installments at the
merchants' fair. G had not paid S, wherefore A's credit was injured with G and S. Although the bill itself is not mentioned,
authorities agree that it was an action by a remitter against a
drawer." Again in 1595, Rastell reports another case 5' in which
a remitter, JL, sues a drawer, E, setting forth that the money
paid to the drawer was to be paid by JB to BL "according to the
custom of merchants by way of exchange," and shortly after 1620,
in the case of Monsey v'. Travers,5 2 we have an example of a reS0See 2 Street, Foundation of Legal Liability chap. xxxiii, 343-345.
8 Holdsworth,
History of English Law 160.
51

Rastell's Entries 338b, giving reference to Trinity 37 Elizabeth
Rolls.
52

Vidian, The Exact Pleader 66. The declaration follows:
"John Monnsey, merchant of London, complains of Edward
Travers, merchant of London, (here the pleader sets forth in detail
the custom of reciprocal exchange explained by Malynes, see note
44 above).
"That whereas the aforesaid J and E on the 9th of June 1620,
and long before and continuously afterwards up till now were merchants, residing in London, and whereas the said J on the 9th of
June delivered to the said E, at the instance and request of said E, 250E
payable at usance and a half . . . by way of exchange, 430.C 4s. 4d.

of Flemish money to one PB, merchant at Middleborough, beyond

the seas, or to the bearer of this bill of exchange . . . and whereas
the said E, on receipt of the said 250a . . . directed duplicate bills

of exchange to one RS, merchant in Middleborough requesting the
said R to pay at usance and a half the first bill, the second not being
paid, to the aforesaid PB or bearer, the said 430R 4s. 4d. at Middleborough, for value received at London from said J,and to put it to
his account according to advice (here the pleader recites a second
bill in identical terms).
"And Whereas the said E on the 9th of June 1620, in consideration of the premises took upon himself and faithfully promised the
said J that if the said R should not accept one of the duplicate bills,
and should not pay said 430S 4s. 4d. at usance and a half, whereby
the said bill should be protested that he, the said E agreed to pay
and content the said J of 250E English money.
"And said J in fact says that the first bill of exchange was presented to said R on the 30th day of July 1620 and R subscribed and,
accepted it, and furthermore J says that, although often requested
R has not paid nor satisfied the said P of 430zE 4s. 4d. whereby
said bill was protested.
"And furthermore J says that on the 8th of August 1620 he gave
notice to E of acceptance and protest, nevertheless E, not heeding
his promise and undertaking, refused to pay either 250a or
430£ 4s. 4d. and has not yet paid or contented the said J. Whereby
J suffers loss and brings this suit.
"E pleads no assumpsit."
The fact that this bill is payable to bearer is of no significance
because at this time the expressions "Assignes," "or order," and "or
bearer" were not distinguished. See 8 Holdsworth, History of English
Law 157, 163.
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mitter setting forth his plea alleging the bill and the non-payment
and seeking recovery from the drawer in an action of assumpsit.
This declaration, like all the older cases, sets forth a promise
on the part of the drawer to repay the remitter's money if the bill
is not paid, and the claim is in the alternative either for the return
of the money or the payment of the bill. That the promise to return the money to the drawer is a fiction and the real purpose of
the action is recovery on the instrument according to the custom
of merchants, is shown by the case of Shepard v. Beecher,53 a suit
in Kings Bench about 1632, where the remitter in his declaration
against the drawer sets forth the bill, the dishonor, the protest,
and the usual promise of repayment; but the jury finds54 only
the existence of the bill, its dishonor and the custom of merchants
that the drawer will pay the bill at maturity. This, the author
seems to think, is a sufficient allegation and finding of fact to support an action of assumpsit.
Thus we find that at this early date the right of the remitter
to recover on the instrument from the drawer, was contemporane5
ous with the right of the payee to recover from the acceptor.
Probably it was through the right of the remitter to recover from
the drawer that the payee and endorsees later obtained similar
56
rights.
The failure of later English cases in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries to mention the rights of the remitter, probably, are due to many causes. In many of these early reports the
53

Brown, The Entring Clerks Vade Mecum 8, 29. Also discussed
in 1 54Cranch (U.S.) Appendix 380, 2 L. Ed. 378.
Part of the verdict was as follows: "The custom of merchants
is that all sums payable at usance are payable one month after date
of the bill, and that if the party to whom the bill is directed shall not
accept the bill or pay it, that he that subscribed or directed the bill
ought to pay the sums delivered to him after the time when the bill
due."
becomes
55
This is due, of course, to the common-law attitude that only
parties directly concerned in the transaction could recover upon a
contract. Oste v. Taylor, (1612) Croke James I, 306, 1 Rolls, Ab. 6,
the payee recovers from the acceptor on the grounds of his direct
promise; Rastell's Entries 338a, citing M-37 Trinity, 38 Elizabeth
Rolls, allows payee a recovery against an acceptor; and in Vidian
Entries 67 is another plea by a payee against an acceptor.
56A case in Herne, Pleader 136, citing Trin. 13 Eliz. Rolls, allows
a remitter who is also the payee to recover from the drawer, and in
Martin v. Boure, (1602) Croke James I, 6, we find a drawer recovering
from an acceptor after showing that he has paid the bill to the
remitter; Vanheath v. Turner, (1622) Winch 24, seems to be a case
of a remitter (who possibly may also be a payee) suing one of the
members of the firm of acceptors; and Barnaby v. Rigalt, (1633)
Croke Car. 301, may be a similar case; see also 8 Holdsworth, History
of English Law 161-164.
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parties to the bills are vaguely stated and, therefore, it is hard 5to7
determine the exact interest of the plaintiff in the instrument.
Most of these cases are concerned with the detaTls of the adjustment of common and statute law"s to the negotiable instrument,
and especially with the development of the rights inter se of
drawers, payees, indorsers and indorsees. The development of
these new rights offered a shorter and more convenient means of
settling obligations on negotiable instruments, and thus the remitter's name gradually disappeared from the instrument itself and
from the litigation. But probably the best explanation of the absence of suits by remitters lies in the fact that their rights were
so well established in the early law, and in the custom of merchants, that business men and bankers were always willing to preserve their credit by paying the remitter. Thus few cases reached
the higher courts.
Although the remitter's rights were seldom litigated during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we have a number of instances showing that common law courts continued to regard him
as having legal rights on the instrument. As late as 1785 we find
a text writer59 stating that there are generally four parties to a bill
of exchange and that payment to the remitter discharges the instrument. In cases where the drawer's bankruptcy has prevented
payment to the remitter, although various ingenious theories of
equity and trust have been urged upon the courts, they have uniformly held that, in absence of fraud, the remitter of a bill has
only a legal right to prove the instrument and come in on a par
with the other creditors.60
In light of these facts it is not surprising that the courts in
57For

examples of this type of reporting see Edkar v. Chut,

(1665) 1 Keb. 592; Hards Case, (1697) 1 Salkeld 23; Barnaby v.
Rigalt, (1633) Croke Car. 301; Jacomo de Brett v. Lawrence, (1672)
2 Keb. 770; Brough v. Parkings, (1704) 6 Mod. 80, 1 Salk. 130, 3
Salk. 69, 2 Raym. 992; Jackson v. Pigott, (1699) 1 Salk. 127, 1 Raym.
364. 5
8The promissory note was the first form known to continental
merchants but did not achieve negotiability in English law till the
Statute of Ann, in 1704. For further account of the history of
negotiable notes see texts cited in note 47 above.
594 Comyn, Digest of Laws of England 239, 244.
60
In re Melbourne Bank Limited, Ferguson's Case, (1897) 23

Victoria Law Reports 78; ex parte Denton Hat Factory Co., Ltd.,

(1897) 23 Victoria Law Reports 87; Re Watson & Co., (1904) Ex
parte Lloyd, (1904) 91 L. T. R. 665; Jewett v. Yardley, (C.C. Pa.
1897) 91 Fed. 920. For a further discussion of the rights created in
this and similar situations see Notes in 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 83, 10
L,. R. A. (N.S.) 928, 39 L. R. A. (N.S.) 563.
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the United States during the nineteenth century allowed a remitter to recover ina suit at law on the bill.6 '
The theory that the remitter has legal rights on the instrument
also offers a satisfactory explanation of the recent cases which
arose shortly after the world war due to the sudden interruption
of business by hostilities. In these cases, due to depreciation of
European currency, it became important to discover at what time
the remitter's rights arose, and whether his recovery was to be
measured in foreign or domestic currency. Some of the decisions
have treated the transaction between the remitter and the drawer
as a "sale of credit.26 2

Under this theory the remitter has two

remedies. If the bank has committed a complete breach of contract
in not arranging for acceptance by the foreign drawee he may
rescind and recover his money ;63 but if the bank has carried out
its part of the contract by arranging for the acceptance, the remitter is allowed to recover the value of the draft at time of presentment and refusal, plus the usual damages. 64 This simply amounts
to allowing the remitter a recovery on the instrument in all cases
except in complete failure of performance on the part of the
drawer, where a rescission and recovery from the drawer would be
allowed; and is a proper extension of the remitter's rights against
the drawer or maker to correspond with those of the modern
payee.
In cases where the co-makers, sureties or irregular indorsers
were parties to the transaction with the remitter and knew the
purpose for which the instrument was drawn, the rights of the
remitter to recover from them should rest on the same ground
as that by which he recovers from the principal obligor. The
forms of action and the theory upon which the cases are tried will
be found to vary in the same manner as do those against the principal obligor. 5
61
62 See

cases cited in note 32 above.
See Foreign Trade Banking Corporation v. Cosmopolitan Trust
Co., (1922) 240 Mass. 413, 414, 134 N. E. 403, where part of the checks
in suit by the remitter against the drawer were payable to a third
party. See also Legniti v. Mechanics and Merchants Nat. Bank.
(1921) 230 N. Y. 415, 130 N. E. 597, introductory remarks by the
court.
63
See Grossman v. Zaro, (1922) 119 Misc. Rep. 713, 715, 197 N.
Y. S.64 305, 307.
This result is reached in Massachusetts by statute. Foreign
Trade Banking Corporation v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., (1922) 240 Mass.
413, 414, 134 N. E. 403; and in New York by judicial decision. See Grossman v. Zaro, (1922) 119 Misc. Rep. 713, 715, 197 N. Y. S. 305, 307, citing
Scheibe v. Zaro, (1922) 199 App. Div. 807, 192 N. Y. S. 433, as a
proper measure of damages in such a case.
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In cases where the co-maker sureties are not parties to the
transaction with the remitter but sign the instrument at the request of the principal obligor, a different situation arises. Since
the instrument is made payable to a named payee, it might be
argued that the surety never intended to become liable to the remitter, is not a party to any contract with him, and therefore, it is
a diversion of the paper to allow anybody except the payee and
those holding under him to recover. Following this view, it has
been held in Massachusetts that the surety co-maker was not-liable
unless he know the exact purpose of the note.66 But there are a
number of cases in other states in which the courts have held the
surety liable even though he did not know the exact purpose of
the instrument,6 7 arguing that the general purpose of the instrument was to raise money for the benefit of the obligor, that this
was accomplished without harm to the surety, and therefore he
should be held liable to the remitter. These cases clearly give the
remitter all the rights of the nominal payee against the drawer or
co-maker surety and are another illustration of the remitter's right
on the instrument itself. They are also a further extension of the
principle mentioned above, 68 that, although the original agreement
is not exactly carried out, an accommodating party will be liable
if the instrument is not diverted from the general purpose intended, and so long as the variation does not harm the accom69
modating party.
This seems too clear for argument that since the remitter's
rights rest on the fact that he gave consideration for a bona fide
transaction and is the real party to the bill, any person in the position of a remitter who is a borrower of the paper, who has it for
his own accommodation, or who has procured the instrument by
70
fraud, would have no rights against any of the parties thereon.
05See

cases cited in note 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 above.

It might

be argued that the Statute of Frauds would prevent recovery by the
remitter against the other parties to the instrument; but the fact
that this theory never has been raised indicates that the courts have
taken the view that the only question involved is a suit on the instru- "
ment before them, which clearly satisfies the requirements of the
so far as a memorandum in writing is concerned.
statute
60
Allen v. Ayers, (1829) 3 Pick. (Mass.) 297.
OlUtica Bank v. Garrison, (1833) 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 314; Planters
and Merchants Bank v. Blair, (1843) 4 Ala. 613; and see also Cross
v. Rowe, (1850) 22 N. H. 77. The New York case appears to arise
from a non-negotiable note, and, therefore, is a very strong case
against releasing the surety.

esSee
note 9 and cases there cited.
69
A complete discussion of this principle appears below.
0
7 See Moore's article 20 Col. L. Rev. 749, 752-3.
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It is also clear that an ordinary assignee of the remitter would
take only the remitter's rights, and would be subject to the same
defences as he.7' But an assignee for value of an accommodated
remitter might be able to recover on the same grounds as does
an assignee of an accommodated payee ;72 and since the remitter
has a legal right in the instrument, one would expect him to have
power to negotiate it. Thus an innocent payee taking the paper for
value from a remitter would be deemed a holder in due course. 73
The rights of the substituted creditor on an instrument after
the payee has refused to discount it, have raised many questions
on which the courts have expressed a wide divergence of opinions.
All courts will agree that the substituted creditor can hold the
principal obligor for the face-value of the instrument; 74 but there
is the same divergence of opinion on the proper form of action
and theory of recovery as is found in the cases dealing with the
rights of the remitter, some courts allowing the substituted creditor
to use his own name, 75 while others allow recovery in the name
of a nominal payee with or without his consent."'
The cases allowing recovery in the name of the payee would
suggest some doctrine of implied assignment; but this is even more
71See Planters and Merchants Bank v. Blair, (1843) 4 Ala. 613;
Garthwaite v. Bank of Tulare, (1901) 134 Cal. 237, 66 Pac. 326; Trible
v. Bank of Grenada, (1844) 10 Miss. 523.
72See notes 9 and 69.
"3Howard National Bank v. Wilson et al., (1923) 96 Vt. 438, 120
Atl. 889; Munroe v. Bordier, (1849) 8 C. B. 862; Campbell, Cases on
Bills and Notes 437. See also Moore's Article in 20 Col. L. Rev.
749; but see contra view in article by A. M. Hamilton, 24 Juridical
Rev. 41, and for a complete discussion of possibility of payee being
holder in due course see Chafee's Edition of Brannon.
74Granite Bank v. Ellis, (1857) 43 Me. 367;_ Rogers & Kays v.
Sipley & Hunt, (1871) 35 N. J. L. 86; Commercial Bank of Natchez
v. Claiborne, (1840) 6 Miss. (5 How.) 301; Dewey v. Cochran, (1856)
4 Jones (N. C.) 184; Bank of Newbury v. Rand, (1859) 38 N. H. 167;
Rhyan Admr. et al. v. Dunnigan, (1881) 76 Ind. 178; In re Pendleton
Hardware & Implement Co., (1893) 24 Or. 330, 33 Pac. 544; Elliot
v. Abbot, (1842) 12 N. H. 549; Eck v. Schuermeyer, (Tex. Civ. App.
1895) 29 S. W. 241; see also Clinton Bank of Columbus v. Ayers,
(1847)'16 Ohio 283; Bank of Rutland v. Buck, (1830) 5 Wend. (N.Y.)
66; Bull v. Latimer, (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) 80 S. W. 252.
75See Bull v. Latimer, (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) 80 S. W. 252; Adams
Bank v. Jones et al., (1835) 16 Pick. (Mass.) 574; Russell v. Ballard,
(1855) 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 21, 63 Am. Dec. 526; Rogge v. Cassidy,
(1888) 10 Ky. L. Rep. 396, 13 S. W. 716; Rhyan Admr. v. Dunnigan,
(1881) 76 Ind. 178; Elliot v. Abbot, (1842) 12 N. H. 540-54; Eck v.
Schuermeyer, (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) 29 S. W. 241.
USee Granite Bank v. Alonzo Ellis, (1857) 43 Me. 367; Bank of
Rutland v. Buck, (1830) 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 66; Rogers v. Sipley, (1871)
35 N. J. L. 86; 'Commercial Bank of Natchez v. Claiborne, (1840)
6 Miss. 301; Dewey v. Cochran, (1856) 4 Jones (N.C.) 184; Bank of
Newbury v. Rand, (1859) 38 N. H. 167; Hunt v. Aldrich et al., (1853)
27 N. H. 31, 36; Hayden v. Thayer, (1862) 5 Allen (Mass.) 162.
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untenable than in the case of the remitter, because the payee not
only has no rights to assign, but has definitely refused to accept
any interest in the instrument.
Any quasi-contractual recovery would also fail, due to the fact
that there is no failure of consideration, or variation of the original agreement so far as it affects the purchaser and the principal
obligor. As explained above, the substituted creditor can not be
a party to the instrument, and can claim no rights on the paper
itself. This is well established by the case of FirstNational Bank of
Centraliav. Henry Strang77 where the maker of a note made payable to a bank turned it over to his agent to be discounted at the
payee bank. The bank refusing discount, the agent sold the note to
another. It was held that the purchaser could not recover from
the maker of the note either for himself or in the payee's name,
because the note was void for want of delivery. Even though
this can be partially explained on grounds of agency, it shows
clearly that the substituted creditor can get no rights on the note
itself. What claims he may have against the principal obligor
must arise out of the contract between them at the time of the
sale. The instrument, in so far as it affects the suit, is simply
evidence of a new contract between the principal obligor and the
substituted creditor, made at the time of the sale, by which the
creditor lends money to the principal obligor according to the
terms of a note payable to another, which is placed in the hands
of the creditor as evidence of the contract.
Some courts have gone so far as to say that the instrument is
made payable to the substituted creditor in the name of the
payee ;78 a useful fiction in so far as it deals with the obligation of
the principal obligor, because his contract with the substituted
creditor is almost always co-extensive with that set forth in the
instrument, but a very dangerous fiction when dealing with the
surety's obligation, as we shall see, because it substitutes the formal
instrument for the actual agreement and consent of the parties.
Others have suggested by way of dicta that this is a case of
fictitious payee coming under section 9 of the act ;79 but it seems
a sufficient answer to this argument that no cases have been found
77(1874)
72 Ill. 559.
8

7 Rhyan Adm. et al. v. Dunnigan, (1881) 76 Ind. 178; Bank of
Newbury v. Rand, (1859) 38 N. H. 166; see also Cross v. Rowe, (1850)
22 N.79 H. 77, 85.
See Elliot v. Abbot, (1842) 12 N. H. 549, 554; Hunt v. Aldrich,
(1853) 27 N. H. 31, 36.
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which were tried exclusively on this theory. As suggested above,
this is a misapplication of a doctrine of fictitious payee.
If, then, the rights of the substituted creditor against the principal obligor arise solely from the contract made at the time the
instrument is purchased, it follows that his rights against the parties secondarily liable on the original instrument, will be determined by the extent to which the facts show that they have become parties to this transaction.
An examination of the cases shows a number of different situations which affect the liability of the co-maker surety:
1. Where the surety consents to the extra-tenor transfer,
a. The surety's consent is known to the substituted creditor,
b. The surety's consent is not known to the substituted
creditor.
2. The instrumerit is made simply for the general purpose of
raising money and the subject of extra-tenor transfer is not
contemplated at the time it is drawn.
3. Where the surety objects to the extra-tenor transfer,
a. Objection is known to the substituted creditor,
b. Instrument is made for a special purpose only, but the
purpose is not known to the substituted creditor.
Where the surety has consented to the sale of -the instrument,
and this consent is affirmatively shown, it seems clear that he
should be held to the terms of the note as he has signed it. If
the substituted creditor knew of this consent, it is an ordinary
contract of suretyship evidenced by the instrument which states
the terms of the agreement between the parties, neglecting only
to put the substituted creditor's name in place of the nominal
payee's. 80 If the surety consented to the extra-tenor sale and the
substituted creditor did not know of the consent, it could still be
held that the surety had conferred upon his principal the power
to bind him to the creditor, and the note would be sufficient evidence of the contract 8" to bind him when the contract had been
properly executed.
8
°Hayden
8

82

v. Thayer, (1862) 5 Allen (Mass.) 162.
it might be objected, also, in these cases that the Statute of
Frauds would prevent recovery by the purchaser against the surety;
but the point has not been raised, probably due to the fact that in
most cases the surety is a joint maker, or that the courts have mistakenly regarded the cases as dealing with negotiable instruments,
and therefore within the exception of the law merchant that the
instrument is sufficient memorandum to bind the parties thereto.
82Starret v. Barber, (1841) 20 Me. 457; Rhyan, Adm. v. Dunnigan,
(1881) 76 Ind. 178.
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It seems equally clear on the third set of facts mentioned above,
where the surety has objected to the extra-tenor sale of the instrument, that he should not be held liable to the substituted creditor.
The cases are all in accord with this view where the objection to
the transfer is known to the substituted creditor at the time of the
sale, or where the limitation of use of the instrument is apparent
on its face. 83 Where the surety has an agreement with the principal obligor at the formation of the instrument that it is to be
discounted with the payee only, or otherwise restricting the use
of the paper, it also seems clear that he should not be bound when
the principal obligor transfers it to an innocent purchaser con4
trary to the agreement. However, there is a case in Vermont
holding that even in these circumstances, after the payee had refused to discount the note, made for the purpose of raising money
for the benefit of the principal obligor, the purchaser for value
without notice of the restrictive agreement might hold the surety
co-maker. Although the payee refused to allow his name to be
used, the case was decided on the ground of implied assignment
of the nominal payee's rights to the purchaser, the court assuming that the paper itself gave rights to the nominal payee, which
could be transferred to the purchaser by the fiction of assignment. It is submitted that this case is wrong, because the note,
never having been delivered, had no inception as a contract. The
nominal payee acquired no rights, and therefore none could be
transferred to the purchaser. The note, at the time it came to the
purchaser, was simply a joint offer on the part of the principal
maker and his surety to be bound to the payee. The payee had
refused the offer; all these facts were apparent from the face of
the paper itself; and the purchaser should have been put on his
guard. He could acquire no rights against the surety through the
instrument because none existed, and, although the principal obligor could bind himself, he had no power to bind the surety because the agreement between them expressly prohibited it. For
these reasons the substituted creditor, on these facts, should not
be allowed to hold the surety and the large majority of cases are
in accord with this view.85
s3Weyman v. Perry, (1894) 42 S. C. 415, 20 S. E. 287; Rabb v.

Seidel, (1923) 250 S. W. 420. See also Battle v. Cushman, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1896) 33 S. W. 1037; Berjamin v. Rogers, (1891) 126 N. Y. 60,
26 N. E. 970, where this principle was applied even though the note
was 8payable to bearer.
'Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Humphrey, (1864) 36 Vt. 554,
86 Am. Dec. 671.
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The second set of facts mentioned above, where the instrument was made simply for the purpose of raising money for the
benefit of the principal obligor with no further restrictions, except that it was drawn to the order of the payee, has given the
courts the most trouble. On these conditions well reasoned cases
can be found holding that a substituted creditor after the nominal
payee has refused to discount the instrument cannot recover from
the surety, 6 and an equal number may be found holding that he
87
can.
The cases holding that, on these facts, the substituted creditor
has no rights against the co-maker surety seem to rest on better
grounds. As has already been pointed out, there is no contract
between the surety and the nominal payee; the instrument never
had a legal inception because delivery was not accepted by the
payee. Therefore, the payee has no rights and nothing to transfer
to the substituted creditor. It is clear that the substituted creditor
can not claim through the payee. Whatever claim he may have
arises from the transaction with the principal obligor, and any
rights he may have against the surety must also arise from that
transaction. Some of the cases have held that no rights against
the surety could arise because it would be a variation of risk.88
But variation of risk cannot apply because, as yet, the surety is
under no contract obligation. 9
8SBoody v. Bartlett, (1861) 42 N. H. 559; Rogge v. Cassidy, (1888)
10 Ky. L. Rep. 396, 13 S. W. 716; Clinton Bank of Columbus v.
Ayers, (1847) 16 Ohio 283; see also Knox County Bank v. Lloyd,
(1868) 18 Ohio St. 353, where it was held no recovery would lie under
these facts even when the nominal payee later discounted the bill for
the substituted creditor. See also 1 Brandt, Suretyship and Guaranty,
2nd ed., p. 167, sec. 115.
86Granite Bank v. Ellis, (1857) 43 Me. 367; Battle v. Cushman,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1896) 33 S. W. 1037; Adams Bank v. Jones, (1835)
16 Pick. (Mass.) 474; Skowhegan Bank v. Baker et al., (1853) 36
Me. 154; Prescott v. Brinsley, (1850) 6 Cush. (Mass.) 233; Dewey v.
Cochran, (1856) 4 Jones (N.C.) 184; Russell v. Ballard, (1855) 16
B. Mon. (Ky.) 21, 63 Am. Dec. 526; Manufacturers Bank v. Cole,
(1855) 39 Me. 188; In re Pendleton Hardware and Implement Co.,
(1893)87 24 Or. 330, 33 Pac. 544.
Bank of Rutland v. Buck, (1830) 5 Wend. (N.Y.) 68; Barrick
et al. v. Austin et al., (1855) 21 Barb. (N.Y.) 241; Rogers v. Sipley,
(1871) 35 N. J. L. 86; Chase v. Hathorn, (1873) 61 Me. 505; Commercial Bank of Natchez v. Claiborne, (1840) 6 Miss. 301; Ward v.
Northern Bank of Ky., (1853) 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 351; Meek v. Shanks,
(1887) 112 Ind. 207, 13 N. E. 712; Bull v. Latimer,. (Tex. Civ. App.
1904) 80 S. W. 252; Bank of Newbury v. Rand, (1859) 38 N. H. 167;
Hunt88 v. Aldrich et al., (1853) 27 N. H. 31.
Dewey v. Cochran, (1856) 4 Jones (N.C.) 184; Commercial Bank
of Natchez
v. Claiborne, (1840) 6 Miss. 301.
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Granite Bank v. Ellis, (1857) 43 Me. 367; Manufacturers Bank
v. Cole, (1855) 39 Me. 188.

RIGHTS OF REMITTERS

Whatever rights the substituted creditor has must be based on
the power given by the surety to the principal, and since no such
power was actually given, it seems that the surety could not be
bound unless there were facts which showed such power was intended, and that the substituted creditor relied upon those facts.
The only facts which the substituted creditor has on this point are
those on the note itself, and a strict application of the doctrines
of suretyship ought to result in a holding that since the instrument
was made payable to the order of the payee, it is notice to the
substituted creditor that the principal has no actual powe~to bind
the surety. 0
The reasoning supporting the substituted creditor's recovery
from the surety is that the principal obligor, in the absence of any
agreement on the point, has a power to bind the surety, which
arises from the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. All of the cases holding the surety liable lay emphasis on
the fact that the general purpose of the agreement between the
principal and surety was to raise money, and the fact that the
instrument was made payable to the order of a particular person
is of secondary importance. So long as the main purpose, i. e.,
to raise money, is achieved, and there is no loss to the surety
beyond that which he would have suffered under the original contract, there is no reason why he should not be held.
It will be seen that this is a further extension of the doctrine
of liability of parties on accommodation paper mentioned above.9 '
Although it is harmless enough in the case of the assignee of the
accommodated payee, it becomes dangerous when carried to the
'extent indicated here, because it is not always easy for the court
to say the surety may or may not have been injured by the diversion of the paper.
A sounder explanation of these cases, probably, can be found
in the fact that at the time the doctrine arose, business men of the
rural communities had not yet become familiar with the distinction between order and bearer instruments; and it was the custom
for them to purchase paper which rural banks, owing to the shortage of funds, were unable to discount. It was properly held in
Commercial Bank of Natchez v. Claiborne, 2 that it was error to
exclude evidence of such a custom. Many other early cases have
90Dewey v. Cochrane, (1856) 4 Jones (N.C.) 184; Russell v.
Ballard, (1855) 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 21, and see also Battle v. Cushman,
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1896) 33 S. W. 1037.
91
See notes 9 and 68.
92(1840) 6 Miss. 301.
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statements which indicate that at one time it was common.practice for business men to take such paper, discounting it later when
the banks were in funds.93 If this was actually the recognized
practice, these cases holding that the extra-tenor purchaser may
hold the co-maker surety may be explained on the grounds that
the courts are applying the local law merchant. Whatever may
have been the situation in the early nineteenth century, it is clear
that no such business practice exists today, and for this reason one
94
would expect to see this line of cases gradually dying out.

Thejights of the substituted creditor against the irregular indorser are on the same grounds as his rights against the co-maker
surety.9 5 And it is equally clear that the assignee of the substituted
creditor would stand in the same position as the substituted creditor
himself.99
aUTrible v. Bank of Granada, (1844) 10 Miss. 523, 526; see also
Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Humphrey, (1864) 36 Vt. 554, 558;
Trible v. Bank of Grenada, (1844) 10 Miss. 523, 524, 526; Anonymous,
(1652)94 Styles Rep. 366, 1 Chitty, Bills 159.
But see Bull v. Latimer, (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) 80 S. W. 252,
where the Texas court of civil appeals overruled Eck v. Schuermeyer,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1895) 29 S. W. 241, without actually mentioning the
case; and also Chase v. Hathorn, (1873) 61 Me. 505, limiting by inference Skowhegan Bank v. Baker, (1853) 36 Me. 154, and Manufacturers
Bank v. Cole, (1855) 39 Me. 188. These cases seem to indicate a
tendency
to approve rather than disapprove this line of cases.
95
See Starret v. Barber, (1841) 20 Me. 457.
9
6Rogers v. Sipley, (1871) 35 N. J. L. 86; and Ward v. The Northern Bank of Ky., (1853) 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 351.

